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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant is facing trial on two counts of rape, a first degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-402 (West Supp. 2010); one count of forcible 
sodomy, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (West 
Supp. 2010); and one count of forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404 (West Supp. 2010). The State petitioned for 
review of the trial court's interlocutory order granting defendant's motion to waive 
a jury trial without the consent of the prosecution. This Court granted review and 
has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(h) (West 2009) (Add. D). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Rule 17(c), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, permits a defendant to 
waive jury trial in a felony case, but only with the consent of the prosecution and 
approval of the court. See Add. A (Rule). Here, the trial court concluded that 
enforcing the rule would impinge on defendant's due process rights because: (a) a 
criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a bench trial over the objection of the 
prosecution; and (b) under the circumstances of this case, the selection of an 
impartial jury was impossible or unlikely. 
1. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that a defendant has a 
constitutional right to a bench trial over the objection of the prosecution? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's determination of constitutionality is 
reviewed for correctness on appeal. See State v. Angilau, 2011UT 3, \ 7,245 P.3d 745. 
Preservation. The State preserved the issue at R. 114-17 (Add. B) & R139: 7-10, 
14-15,17-19,22-23,25, & 29 (Add. C). 
2. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that compelling a jury trial in this 
case would violate due process because selection of an impartial jury was not 
possible or likely? 
Standard of Review & Preservation. See Issue I. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following determinative provisions are attached in Addendum A: 
U.S. CONST., amend. VI; 
UTAHR.CRIM.P. 17. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In March 2010, defendant was charged with one count of rape, two counts of 
forcible sodomy, and one count of forcible sexual abuse (R. 1-4). The information 
alleged that defendant, who was in her forties, engaged in various sex acts with her 
son's teenage friend (id.). After the victim testified at a preliminary hearing, 
defendant was bound over for trial (R. 16). A three-day jury trial was scheduled for 
August 2010 (R. 22-23). 
The morning of the scheduled jury trial, defendant for the first time sought to 
waive a jury trial and requested that the trial judge determine the case (R139: 3). 
Defendant acknowledged that rule 17(c), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 
permitted jury waiver in a felony case only if the prosecution consented—which it 
had not in this case — but claimed that" there are certain circumstances... where... 
the Court has the discretion" not to enforce the rule (R139: 20). 
Defendant asserted that this case was such a circumstance. She admitted that 
she had illegally engaged in sex with the teenage victim, but claimed that based on 
his alleged consent and other age-based issues, she might be convicted of some 
lesser offense than the offenses charged (R139:5 & 20-21). Defendant explained that 
"an analytical and legal pre-trained mind looking and weighing the factors is going 
to give her a much more objective decision than trying to, in a short time, explain 
and try to articulate to a jury the fine lines between perhaps rape and unlawful 
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sexual activity or unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and for this reason, she is 
choosing to go with the bench as a trier of fact" (R139: 5-6,12-13, & 21). Defendant 
opined that the trial judge would "be more objective in looking specifically at the 
facts and not weighing out the media and the impression that they may have 
already made upon the public down here in the Salt Lake Valley/' but admitted that 
no media had attended "the last couple" of hearings (R139: 6). 
The prosecutor objected (R139: 7-10,17-19, & 22-23). Citing rule 17(c), the 
prosecutor argued that a defendant's waiver of a jury in a felony case could not be 
accepted over the prosecution's objection (R. 114-117; R139:7-10,14-15,17-19,22-23, 
25 & 29). The prosecutor pointed out that precedent interpreting rule 17(c) and an 
identical federal rule had repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of this limitation 
(R. 114-17). And although dicta in the leading Supreme Court case recognized that 
compelling a defendant to undergo a jury trial might possibly violate due process 
"in some circumstances," the Supreme Court and other courts recognized that this 
possibility was rare and might occur only if a defendant established that an 
impartial jury was impossible or unlikely in a given case (R139: 13-24). The 
prosecutor argued that such a circumstance did not exist here, especially given that 
potential jurors had not even been questioned (R139: 7-10,17-19, & 22-23). 
The prosecutor acknowledged that the charges initially generated some media 
attention, but by the time of trial, only one reporter had expressed interest in the 
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case (R139: 9). The prosecutor also noted that if pretrial publicity were a concern, 
the defense should have requested a pretrial juror questionnaire as was often done 
in high-profile cases (R139: 9-10). In any case, any undue influence that publicity 
might have had on an individual juror could be discovered in voir dire and cured 
(R139: 22-23). The prosecutor further explained that the State did not oppose 
inclusion of a lesser offense instruction, but that this involved only one of the four 
charged offenses (R139: 8-9). The prosecutor noted that juries typically consider 
consent and other age-determinative issues in sex offense cases and that there was 
no basis here to assume that the selected jury could not fairly resolve these issues 
(id.). 
The trial court disagreed (R139:10-12,13-15, & 23-26; R. 106-07) (Add. B & C). 
First, the court was "concerned" that rule 17(c)'s requirement of prosecution consent 
unfairly gave the State "the ability to control the case from the standpoint of 
whether its going to be tried by the jury or by the Court" (R139:10-11). The court 
recognized that rule and precedent allowed such "control," but opined that 
compelling a defendant to undergo a jury trial "simply because the State refuses to 
give its consent to the waiver" creates a "tremendous burden" on the defense that 
implicates due process (R139: 13-14). The court second concluded that the 
circumstances of this case mandated a bench trial: 
5 
The Court is satisfied in this case [of defendant's waiver of jury trial] 
because of the nature of the allegations and the prior publicity, along 
with the . . . very fine line between offenses charged and the potential 
lesser included offenses. The Court believes that it would be a denial 
of [defendant's] due process rights to force her to be tried by a jury. 
(R139:14). 
The court then accepted defendant's waiver of jury trial, excused the jury 
pool, and ordered a bench trial to begin the next morning (R139: 14). The court 
refused to stay commencement of the bench trial to allow the State time to seek 
interlocutory review (R138:4-11). The State petitioned this Court for an emergency 
stay and interlocutory review, both of which were granted (R. 121 & 135) (Add. D). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant has not yet been convicted of any crime and the facts are only 
alleged. Nevertheless, the allegations are relevant because the trial court concluded 
that no jury could fairly determine the facts. See Statement of the Case, supra. 
The probable cause statement in the information states that A.B. alleged that 
"beginning around March 1, 2009 through January 31, 2009, he had a sexual 
relationship with the defendant, Jamie Lynn Greenwood. Throughout the above 
time period the defendant would give A.B. gifts and cash and asked to be paid back 
with sexual favors. At the same time the defendant would threaten to call A.B/s 
mother unless he did as she requested" (R. 3). "The two engaged in sexual 
intercourse and had oral sex numerous times at different locations in Salt Lake 
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County. The relationship ended when the defendant and A.B. were discovered as 
the defendant forced A.B. to put his finger in her vagina" (id). A.B. was fifteen and 
sixteen during the above time period, and the defendant was forty and forty-one. 
The defendant was A.B/s friend's mother" (R. 4). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court—as well as the United States Supreme Court—has recognized that 
a defendant charged with a felony has no constitutional right to a bench trial. 
Consequently, both courts have upheld the constitutionally of reasonable limitations 
on a defendant's waiver of jury trial. Specifically, this Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of rule 17(c), UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, which requires 
that the prosecution consent before a defendant's waiver of jury trial is accepted. 
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of 
substantively identical rule 23, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Nevertheless, the trial court refused to enforce rule 17(c) and accepted 
defendant's waiver of jury trial over the prosecution's objection. The court ruled 
that rule 17(c)'s requirement of prosecution consent impinges on a defendant's 
constitutional right to a bench trial. The court further concluded that compelling 
this defendant to undergo a jury trial violated due process because selection of an 
impartial jury in this case was impossible or unlikely. Although the court had not 
yet questioned a single prospective juror, it based its decision on three factors: (1) 
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the case involved sex charges; (2) defendant claimed that the teenage victim 
consented; and (3) the case had generated some pretrial publicity. The trial court 
erred. 
It is well established that compelling a defendant to undergo a jury trial 
impinges on no constitutional right. Some dicta in the leading Supreme Court case 
acknowledges the possibility that compelling a defendant to undergo a jury trial 
might implicate due process, but only in the unusual circumstance where "passion, 
prejudice[,or] public feeling" rendered selection of an impartial jury impossible or 
unlikely. Numerous cases recognize, however, that this circumstance rarely, if ever, 
occurs. Contrary to the trial court's ruling, no such unusual circumstance exists 
here and enforcement of rule 17(c) would not have resulted in an unfair trial. 
In sum, the trial court's acceptance of defendant's jury waiver should be 
reversed and a jury trial ordered. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH A FELONY HAS 
NO CONSTITUINAL RIGHT TO A BENCH TRIAL OVER THE 
OBJECTION OF THE PROSECUTION; CONSEQUENTLY, THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ENFORCING RULE 17 
In Utah, a defendant charged with a felony may waive jury trial only with the 
consent of the prosecution: 
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All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a 
jury in open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution. 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17(c) (Add. A). Rule 17(c) is patterned on a substantively identical 
federal rule: 
If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury 
unless: 
(1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing; 
(2) the government consents; and 
(3) the court approves. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (Add. A). Both rules embrace a criminal defendant's 
constitutional right to be tried by a jury. But both state and federal precedent 
interpreting these rules recognize that the converse is not true: a defendant has no 
constitutional right to a bench trial. See cases cited, below. 
In this case, the trial court refused to enforce rule 17(c) and granted 
defendant's waiver of jury trial over the objection of the prosecution (R. 106-07) 
(Add. B). The court's reasoning was two-fold. The court first concluded that a 
defendant has a constitutional right to a bench trial whether or not the prosecution 
consents (R. 106). The court second concluded that compelling this defendant to 
undergo a jury trial violated due process because no jury could be impartial in this 
case (R. 106-07). 
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Both determinations are erroneous. A criminal defendant charged with a 
felony has no constitutional right to a bench trial. See discussion, below. And the 
circumstances of this case do not establish that an impartial jury was impossible or 
unlikely. See Point II. The trial court's order granting defendant's motion to waive 
jury trial should be reversed. 
* * * 
Over fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not "carry with it the right to 
insist upon the opposite of that right." Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34-35 
(1965). That is, a defendant has no constitutional right to a bench trial. Id. See also 
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382-83 (1979) (reaffirming Singer's 
holding that defendants may not compel "private" bench trials over "public" jury 
trials). 
This Court has consistently recognized the same principle. See State v. 
Robbins, 709 P.2d 771,772 (Utah 1985) (holding that "there is no constitutional right 
to a trial by a judge rather than a jury"); State v. Davis, 689 P.2d 5,13 (Utah 1984) 
(holding that "neither the state nor the federal constitution guarantees [a defendant] 
a right to 'waive' a jury trial); and State v. Studham, 655 P.2d 669,671 (Utah 1982) 
(same). 
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Consequently, a defendant's waiver of a jury trial— like other constitutional 
rights — may be "subjected to reasonable procedural regulations." Singer, 380 U.S. at 
at 35. Such reasonable regulation includes conditioning the acceptance of a 
defendant's jury waiver upon the consent of the prosecution and the approval of the 
court. Id. at 36. See also Robbins, 709 P.2d at 771-72; Davis, 689 P.2d at 12-13; and 
Studham, 655 P.2d at 671 (all upholding requirement of prosecution consent). 
While such a limitation may compel a defendant to "undergo a jury trial 
against his will," it is not "contrary to his right to a fair trial or to due process," 
because "the result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by 
jury — the very thing that the constitution guarantees him." Singer, 380 U.S. at 36. 
Moreover, the government, "as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that 
cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal 
which the Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result." Id. See also 
State v. justice Court, 56 P.3d 5,10; Commonwealth v. Tharp, 754 A.2d. 1251,1253-54 
(Perm. 2000) (both upholding legitimacy of state constitutional provisions granting 
prosecution same jury trial right as defendant). 
Here, the trial court acknowledged rule 17(c)'s requirement of consent and the 
precedent upholding that requirement (R139:10-11 & 13; R.106). Nevertheless, the 
court refused to enforce rule 17(c) because the court disagreed with the rule's 
underlying premise. According to the trial court, compelling a defendant to 
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undergo a jury trial creates a "tremendous burden" that potentially infringes on a 
defendant's "due process rights" (R139:13-14; R. 106-07). 
No Supreme Court or federal circuit court decision has so held, however. See 
United States v. U.S. Dist Court for Eastern Dist. of Calif., 464 F.3d 1065,1070-72 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (recognizing that federal appellate decisions have consistently upheld 
constitutionality of rule 23's government consent requirement), cert, denied, 551 U.S. 
1133 (2007). The Utah Supreme Court—like the majority of state courts —has 
likewise concluded that there is no constitutional infringement in requiring the 
prosecution's consent for jury waiver. See Robbins, 709 P.2d at 772 (recognizing Utah 
has consistently upheld constitutionality of rule 17(c)'s requirement of prosecution 
consent for jury waiver); State v. Oakley, 72 P.3d 1114,1120-21 (Wash. App. 2003) 
(citing various state authorities upholding requirement of prosecution consent). The 
few decisions to the contrary are based on specific state provisions granting a 
defendant the unilateral right to control the mode of trial. See id. at 1121 (citing 
Oregon and Illinois contrary decisions based on their state constitutional or common 
law provisions). Or, one case was based on the defendant's religious belief in a non-
jury trial See United States v. Lewis, 638 F.Supp. 573,581 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (ruling 
that "sincerely held religious belief against submitting to a jury trial" is protected 
under the First Amendment and trumps procedural rule requiring government 
consent to jury waiver). 
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The trial court's conclusion here was erroneously based on dicta in Singer 
(R139: 10-14; R. 106-107). In Singer, the Supreme Court noted the possibility that 
compelling a defendant to undergo a jury trial might result in a due process 
violation in the rare circumstance where no impartial jury could be seated: 
We need not determine in this case whether there might be some 
circumstances where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by a 
judge alone are so compelling that the Government's insistence on trial 
by jury would result in a denial to a defendant of an impartial trial. 
Petitioner argues that there might arise situations where "passion, 
prejudice . . . public feeling" or some other factor may render 
impossible or unlikely an impartial trial by jury. However, since 
petitioner gave no reason for wanting to forgo jury trial other than to 
save time, this is not such a case, and petitioner does not claim that it is. 
Singer, 380 U.S. at 37-38. In the ensuing years since Singer, no federal appellate court 
has ever found such a case to actually exist. See U.S. Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of 
Calif, 464 F.3d at 1070-71 (recognizing that neither Supreme Court nor federal circuit 
courts have found "circumstances alluded to in Singer actually existed"). But see 
United States v. Clark, 943 F.2d 775,784 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that a defendant has 
no constitutional right to bench trial, but recognizing two federal district court cases 
from 1970's that allowed jury waiver over government objection due to complexity 
of trying "multiple defendants" on "multiple medicaid, medicare and tax fraud" 
charges), cert, denied, 509 U.S. 926 (1993). Utah likewise has never found such a case 
to actually exist. Cf Robbins, 709 P.2d at 772. 
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Moreover, decisions discussing Singer's dicta recognize that not being able to 
impanel an impartial jury is only a remote possibility given the "abundance of 
tools'7 trial courts have to ensure a fair trial. For example, courts may order pretrial 
jury questionnaires; they may conduct more extensive voir dire; they may grant 
additional jury strikes; they may limit admission of unduly prejudicial evidence; or 
they may continue a trial to allow any adverse impact of pretrial publicity to 
diminish. See UTAH R. CRIM. P. 18 (governing selection of jury); UTAH R. EVID. 403 
(permitting relevant, but unduly prejudicial information to be excluded). See also 
U.S. Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Calif., 464 F.3d at 1071 (recognizing that jury 
questionnaires, individual voir dire, jury instructions, and limitations on admission 
of unduly prejudicial evidence minimize possibility of inflaming or biasing jury); 
United States v. Daniels, 282 F.Supp. 360, 361 (N.D. 111. 1968) (recognizing that trial 
continuance after media coverage had ended likely would reduce adverse effect of 
pretrial publicity on potential jurors). Tnus, while the possibility of a due process 
violation may exist in some rare case, this possibility does not negate the general 
legitimacy of waiver-limitation rules. Rather, recognition of such a possibility 
acknowledges only a truism: a defendant may prove a denial of due process if he 
establishes that his trial was unfair. 
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In sum, the trial court erred in concluding that a defendant charged with a 
felony has a constitutional right to a bench trial over the objection of the 
prosecution. As a result, the trial court erred in not enforcing rule 17(c). 
II. 
SELECTION OF AN IMPARTIAL JURY WAS NOT IMPOSSIBLE 
OR UNLIKELY IN THIS CASE; CONSEQUENTLY, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN NOT ENFORCING RULE 17 
The trial court also erroneously concluded that enforcement of rule 17(c) in 
this case would necessarily result in an unfair trial because selection of an impartial 
jury was impossible or unlikely (R139:10-14; R. 106-07). 
After the court concluded that rule 17(c)'s requirement of prosecution consent 
could not constitutionally be required in all cases, the court considered the rule's 
application to the facts of this case (R139:14; R. 106-07). The court concluded that 
three circumstances established the impossibility of a fair trial if defendant were 
compelled to undergo a jury trial: (1) the case involved sex offenses; (2) a "close 
line" existed between the charged offenses and any lesser offense based on consent 
and the victim's age; and (3) there had been some pretrial publicity (id.). None of 
these circumstances, however, establishes that a jury trial would be unfair. 
As discussed, the trial court relied on Singe/s dicta in concluding that 
enforcement of rule 17(c) in all cases would be unconstitutional. The trial court 
relied on the same dicta in concluding that enforcement of the rule in this case 
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would result in an unfair trial (R. 13-14; R. 106-07). But as discussed, very few cases 
have reached a similar conclusion based on the facts of a given case. See cases, supra, 
at 13. 
The trial court first concluded that the sexual nature of the charges established 
that no jury hearing the case could be impartial (R. 13; R. 106). That conclusion is 
erroneous. The fact that sex crimes are involved does not affect the applicability of 
rule 17(c) or its constitutional preference for jury trial. See Robbins, 709 P.2d at 771-
72 (compelling jury trial in child sex abuse case did not violate due process). See also 
U.S. Dist. Court for the Eastern Dist. of Calif., 464 F.3d at 1067 & 1071-72 (compelling 
defendants to face jury trial in "horrific" case involving "ten yeairs of ritualistic 
sexual abuse" and five children did not violate due process). Moreover, juries 
comply resolve sex crime allegations — including allegations involving issues of 
consent and minors. See, e.g., State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, 243 P.3d 1250 (reversing 
based on erroneous jury instructions and remanding for new jury trial of 
polygamous religious leader charged with rape as an accomplice based on 
performance of underage "marriage"); State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, 137 P.3d 726 
(upholding jury convictions for bigamy and unlawful sexual conduct with minor 
arising from polygamous underage "marriage"); State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40,116 P.3d 
360 (upholding jury instructions on consent and affirming convictions for rape of a 
child and sodomy on a child). 
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The trial court next concluded that no jury could fairly resolve the "close line" 
between the charged offenses and any lesser offense based on consent and other 
age-determinative issues (R. 13-14; R. 106-07). But again, juries typically resolve 
such issues. See cases cited, above. And, in any event, a defense of consent in a case 
involving adult sex with a minor is statutorily limited. See State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 
80, If 18, 52 P.3d 1276; State v. Christensen, 2001 UT 14, 1 8, 20 P.3d 329 (both 
recognizing legislative policy of enacting laws that protect minors from sex with 
adult regardless of minor's willingness to participate in offense). 
The trial court also concluded that no impartial jury could be selected in this 
case because some pretrial publicity had occurred (R. 13-14; R. 106-07). While it is 
undisputed that some publicity occurred initially (R139: 9), the record does not 
establish to what extent this publicity continued over the ensuing months. 
Moreover, defense counsel admitted that no members of the media had even 
attended the "last couple" of hearings before the scheduled trial (R139: 6). 
In any case, the mere fact that some pretrial publicity occurred does not 
establish that all the potential jurors were exposed to that publicity or that any of the 
potential jurors were biased. See State v. James, 767 P.2d 549, 555 (Utah 1989) 
(recognizing that "[j]urors are commonly seated to hear felony trials after . . . 
[having heard] prejudicial information about the defendant and perhaps even 
having formulated some opinion as to guilt," if they fairly represent that "they 
17 
would be able to set aside any preconceived notions and decide the case on the 
evidence presented at triar). Nor can the record establish that any of the potential 
jurors in this case were partial or otherwise incapable of fairly deciding the case 
where none was even questioned before the trial court ruled. See State v. Widdison, 
2001 UT 60, f f 35-39, 28 R3d 1278 (recognizing that despite extensive pretrial 
publicity in small community, ultimate impartiality of jury established through jury 
questionnaires and jury voir dire). 
In sum, the trial court's presumption that no impartial jury was possible or 
likely in this case is not supportable by the record. Consequently, the court erred in 
concluding that enforcement of rule 17(c) would necessarily result in defendant 
being deprived of a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's "Decision on Defendant's Motion 
to Waive Trial by Jury" should be reversed and jury trial ordered. 
Respectfully submitted April 7th, 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney<?eheral 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 - The Trial 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial with the 
following exceptions: 
(a)(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions, defendant may consent 
in writing to trial in his absence; 
(a)(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(a)(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause 
shown which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial 
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(b)(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(b)(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody; 
(b)(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance; and 
(b)(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the defendant waives a jury in 
open court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes 
written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise. No 
jury shall be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in 
Section 78-46-5, U.C. A. 1953. 
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the consent of the accused 
and the approval of the court, by stipulation in writing or made orally in open 
court, proceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress with any number of 
jurors less than otherwise required. 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the 
following order: 
(g)(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(g)(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement amd the defense 
may make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested; 
(g)(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(g)(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(g)(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, 
for good cause, otherwise permits; 
(g)(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the 
court shall instruct the jury; and 
(g)(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides 
without argument, the prosecution shall open the argument, the defense shall 
follow and the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. 
The court may set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party 
and the time to be allowed for argument. 
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate 
juror has been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate juror. If no 
alternate has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number 
of jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a new trial 
ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors. A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to 
a witness as provided in this section. 
(i)(l) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the 
process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial finder of fact and 
does not become an investigative body. The judge may disallow any question 
from a juror and may discontinue questions from jurors at any time. 
(i)(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the 
jurors that they may write the question as it occurs to them and submit the 
question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. The judge should advise the 
jurors that some questions might not be allowed. 
(i)(3) The judge shall review the question with counsel and unrepresented parties 
and rule upon any objection to the question. The judge may disallow a question 
even though no objection is made. The judge shall preserve the written question 
in the court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask the question or 
permit counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. The question may be 
rephrased into proper form. The judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented 
parties to examine the witness after the juror's question. 
(j) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be sworn that while the 
jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subject connected with 
the trial and to return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a specified 
time. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are 
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the court that it is their duty not to 
converse among themselves or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty 
not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally submitted to 
them. 
(1) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with them the instructions of 
the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except exhibits 
that should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such 
as exhibits of unusual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the 
jury to view exhibits upon request. Jurors are entitled to take notes during the 
trial and to have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the 
court shall provide jurors with writing materials and instruct the jury on taking 
and using notes. 
(m) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in 
some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict 
or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the 
court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any 
communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if 
they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is 
rendered, communicate to any person the state of their deliberations or the 
verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire to be informed on any 
point of law arising in the cause, they shall inform the officer in charge of them, 
who shall communicate such request to the court. The court may then direct that 
the jury be brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant and 
both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise the jury that no 
further instructions shall be given. Such response shall be recorded. The court 
may in its discretion respond to the inquiry in writing without having the jury 
brought before the court, in which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall 
be entered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face, it may be corrected by 
the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
(p) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or at the conclusion of 
all the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally 
sufficient to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included offense. 
Federal R. Crim. P. 23 - Jury or Nonjury Trial 
(a) Jury Trial. If the defendant is entitled to a jury trial, the trial must be by jury unless: 
(1) the defendant waives a jury trial in writing; 
(2) the government consents; and 
(3) the court approves. 
(b) Jury Size. 
(1) In General. A jury consists of 12 persons unless this rule provides otherwise. 
(2) Stipulation for a Smaller Jury. At any time before the verdict, the parties may, with 
the court's approval, stipulate in writing that: 
(A) the jury may consist of fewer than 12 persons; or 
(B) a jury of fewer than 12 persons may return a verdict if the court finds it necessary to 
excuse a juror for good cause after the trial begins. 
(3) Court Order for a Jury of 11. After the jury has retired to deliberate, the court may 
permit a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict, even without a stipulation by the parties, 
if the court finds good cause to excuse a juror. 
(c) Nonjury Trial. In a case tried without a jury, the court must find the defendant 
guilty or not guilty. If a party requests before the finding of guilty or not guilty, the 
court must state its specific findings of fact in open court or in a written decision or 
opinion. 
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H/ f tDiSft^^, 
P I III rilliliI IIID1CIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEST JORDAiy)EMRTME!^ 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH WJEST JORDAN \Jzr 
* 
M v r E O F U T A H > * 
Plaintiff, * DECISION ON DEFEND \h 
* MOTION TO WAIVE 
v. * TRIAL BY JUR\ 
JAMIE GREENWOOD, * Case No.: 101400544 
Defendant * Honorable Robert W vdkins 
THIS MATTER came before the Court pnoi to the beginning of the jur} selection 
process in the trial of the abcw e-captioned matter. Defense counsel on behalf of Defendant, 
ui n ed u wai\ v Ilk |UP in tln( mattci and to piOLixd with a luidi In il The State obKttt j to 
the wancr ot a )iir> pursuant to Rule I u i w] the I tah Rules ot luminal Proceduic 
The Court, after having re\ icwed the applicable case law in this area, requested Defense 
Counsel to state on the record the basis for the motion After leceh nig the basis for the motion 
and the State's argument in objection thereto, thi* Court hereb\ make5- the following ruling 
1. I hi" < ourt undtiwtand Pule 1 ~V) nl the I 'lah Rule*" ni < nnun ii Pioieduie and Ihc u se 
Ian applicable to the matter at hand The Court behe\ es that upon a proper show mg a 
defendant should be able to waive his or her right to a jun trial I o allow the State in 
every case 10 defeat this abiiin would place a tremendous burden upon a Defendant and a 
tiiniendous amount ol power in the lianas ol the State Flit State although iepi renting 
the people 3^  not -ubud 1n the lo^ oi nherr as b a defendant 
2 I lnc court behe\es that ii a defendant can make a showing upon a proper basis why a 
defendant desires to waive a jun. thiib Court belie\ es that b> denying such reque »t simph 
at the objection of the State would implicate the due piocess rights of the Defendant. 
3. The Court is satisfied that Defendant has met t « buidcn because of the natuie ol the t ase, 
ih * publkii\ this tasa ha- jx,ei\ad and the Ink una hJwcui the offenses chaigad and 
lesser included offenses w men tiie court has agreed to consider. In the Supreme Couit 
OO00106 
decision of Singer v United States, the Supreme Court stated, "we need not determine m 
this case whether there might be some circumstances where a defendant's reasons for 
wanting to be tried by a judge alone are so compelling that the Government's insistence 
on a trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant of an impartial trial." This 
Court believes that the cumulative impact of the factors stated above creates such an 
unusual circumstance. 
4. This Court finds that it would be a denial of Defendant's due process rights to refuse to 
honor Defendant's request to waive a jury trial. Therefore, Defendant's motion is hereby 
granted. 
DATED this / day of August, 2010. 
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Transcript of Hearing 
August 4, 2 010 
PROCEEDINGS 
BAILIFF: Sorry, Your Honor. Mr. 
Arrington, I think, just walked to the restroom. 
THE COURT: That's fine. It took me a 
little longer than I anticipated. Alright, we're 
on the record in the case of State of Utah v. 
Jamie Lynn Greenwood. It's Case 010400544. 
Counsel will state their appearances, please. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Mark Arrington 
representing Jamie Greenwood, co-counsel with Jim 
Retallick. 
THE COURT: Alright, and for the State? 
MS. CRANDALL: Kim Crandall and Marc 
Mathis for the State, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright, and the defendant 
is present. We're outside the presence of the jury 
panel. I did have an in chambers meeting with all 
counsel ihis morning. Mr. Arrington indicated that 
Ms. Greenwood wanted to waive her right: to be tried 
by jury, and I was informed the State objected to 
that. So I wanted to put that on the record. Mr. 
Arrington, I'll hear from you. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Well, Your Honor, and 
THACKERiCO 
ThackerCo.com 
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j b v i o u s 1 y , a s I ' v e b e e n t a 1 k i n g w i t h in y c ] i e n t c v e r 
the m o n t h s , and e s p e c i a l l y the last few wee k s 
l o o k i n g at o p t i o n s , d i s c u s s i n g the n u m e r o u s a v e n u e s 
h a t w e I: i a v e a n ci w e i g h :i n g t i" e p a r t i c u ] a r s o f t h i s . 
: a s e ,. m y c 1 i e n t w a n t s t o p 1 a c e h e r c o n f i d e n c e a. n d 
v r u s t i n h a v i n g a b e n c h t r i a 1 a t t h i s t i m e , a n d 
w i s h e s t o w a i v e t h e o p ti o n o r t h e r i g h t c f a ' j u r y . 
T H E (I! C • U F T i 1 3 i " i g h 1: , a n d: M s G i e e n w c c • d , 
•' ~ t h a t a c c u r a t e ? Is t h a t w h a t y o u w o u 1 d 1- i k e t. o 
M S . G R E E N W O O D : Y e s , S li r . 
T H E C 0 U F T : A n d M r . A r r i n g t o n , w i t h o u t 
g e t t i n g t o o f a r i n t o t h e s p e c i f i c s of i t , I f e 
l o o k e d a t a f e w o f t h e c a s e s i n t h i s a r e a a n d a l s o 
. 3: i. e i u J e , T h e C c u i: I: , I b e ] i e \ e , t o m a k e a 
d e c i s i o n , w o u l d n e e d t o k n c w t h e r e a s o n b e h i n d t h a t 
w a i v e r if I'm g o i n g t o b e a b l e t o g r a n t i t , a n d 
' ] 1 h e a r f r o m y o u , M r I r r i n g t o n . I d o n ' t w a n t t o 
g e t i n t o t h e f a c t s o f i t , b u t j u s t g e n e r a l l y , t h e 
r e a s o n t h a t M s . G r e e n w o o d w a n t s t o w a i v e a t r i a l by 
- u r y . • • • • • 
M R . A R R I N G T O N a n d j u s t t o m a k e 
it c l e a r , Y o u r H o n o r , s h e u n d e r s t a n d s s h e h a s t h e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o c h o o s e a j u r y of h e r p e e r s 
c h o s e n f r o m t h e c o m m u n i t y . I ' v e e x p l a i n e d t h a t to 
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her exhaustively. She feels that, first of all, to 
say nothing of judicial comity and so forth, that 
her faith and her belief about getting a fair and 
reasonable and objective trier of fact at this 
point and under the circumstances of this case lies 
greater with a bench trial, rather than a jury and 
believes that the legal analysis that's going to be 
applied specifically to this case, the argument is 
not if illegal circumstances happened. She 
cooperated with authorities on this and gave 
admissions. The question that this whole case 
surrounds is a question of consent, and reviewing 
the law with my client, believes that there is a 
relatively fine line between — in issues of consent. 
If there is consent under the 
circumstances and the facts of the case between the 
victim and my client, then there are lesser 
included offenses than what she is charged with. 
We believe that having an analytical and legal pre-
trained mind looking and weighing the factors is 
going to give her a much more objective; decision 
than trying to, in a very short time, explain and 
try to articulate to a jury the fine lines between 
perhaps rape and unlawful sexual activity or 
unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and for this 
THACKERiC 
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:: e a s o n , she is c h o o s i n g t o g o with the b e n c h as a 
rier of f a c t . 
THE C O U R T : A l r i g h t . Does part of the 
I e c i s i c n t c a s k ': o i; ; a i v e 1: h e j i 1 r y
 f d c e s t h a t h a v e 
i n y t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e p i i b 1 i ci t y in t h i s c a s e , o r 
•: h e n a t u r e o f t h e a 1 1 e g a t i o n s ? x 
MR. A R R I N G T O N : It d o e s , Your H : : : r . 
'. t a o e s ., a l t h o u g h the last couple of fins ;. . - -
t r i a l s , for i n s t a n c e , th a t we've had h a s n ' t 
i n c l u d e d m e d i a . 11 wa s h e a v i l y in the m e d i a at the 
:i in e a i : a i e e . w a s a t i e a s t s o m e 
e x p o s u r e , i f not .quite a. b i t c f e x p c s u r e . T h e r e 
v a s n; u 11 i p 1 e c h a n n e l s an d T . V . s t a t i o n s , - H e r ' 
p i c t u r e is p l a s t e r e d on the w e b s i t e at KSL a n d the 
State has m a i n t a i n e d in their n e g o t i a t i o n s t h a t 
: his is a p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , h i g h - p r o f i l e case and 
that' causes- c o n c e r n for my client as well a n d , 
i g a i n , f e e J s t h a t a r • e n c 1: I t r :i a ] i s g o i n g t c • i: e m c: r € 
o b j e c t i v e in l o o k i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y at t h e f a c t s a n d 
n o t w e i g h i n g o u t t h e m e d i a a n d t h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t 
t h e y m a y h a v e a l r e a d y m a d e u p o n the' p u b l i c d o w n 
h e r e in t h e S a l t L a k e V a l l e y . 
THE C O U R T : A l r i g h t , and as to t h e 
le s s e r and i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s , I will tell a l l 
c o u n s e l that I spent quite a bit of time y e s t e r d a y 
THACKER40 
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looking at the case, and also specifically dealing 
with lesser included offenses. I do believe that 
if the matter were tried by a jury, that a court, 
at this point, preliminarily at least, would be 
inclined to submit some lesser and included 
offenses, and I don't know whether based on that, 
that would change Ms. Greenwood's decision on 
requesting the waiver of the jury. 
MR. ARRINGTON: It would not, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright. Mr. Arrington, is 
there anything further at this time? 
MR. ARRINGTON: I would submit it on 
those arguments, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright, and Ms. Crandall? 
MS. CRANDALL: Your Honor, this morning 
is the first we've even heard it. I understand 
he's been in discussion for the last couple of 
weeks about it, but this is the first the State 
ever even heard of this. When we had the pretrial 
last week, it never came up about her possibly 
waiving the jury trial. 
Rule 17(c), under the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, is clear. It says all felony cases 
shall be tried by jury unless the defenaant waives 
THACKERzCO 
ThackerCo.com 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
801-983-2180 j 877-441-2180 
Fax:801-983-2181 
T r a n s c r i p t of Hearlng 0 8/0 4 /10 
a i u i y 2 n o p e r:i > u r t w 2 t n t h e a p p r o v a . t h e c o u r t 
and the c o n s e n t of the p r o s e c u t i o n . T his is a c a s e 
w h e r e the p r o s e c u t i o n i s net c o n s e n t i n g to t h e 
w a i v e r . I u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n c e r n s w i t h ~ "• - -- : a 1 
a r g u m e n t s , b u t t h a t '" s w i : a 1: w e '" r e h e r e : . : : e 
h e r e t o e x p l a i n to t h e j u r y w h a t n e e d s to h a p p e n 
a nd i n s t r u c t t h e m on the ] aw, T hat r s w h y w e h a v e 
t: h e j u r y i i i s 12 : ! 1 c 1:2 0 1 1 s , a 1 1 :i t: 1: 1 a '::' s \ v 1: 1 \ w e • r e :i o i n g 
t o go t h r o u g h t h i s voir d i r e p r o c e s s , I £ t h e r e 
w e r e h u g e c o n c e r n s , as far as the m e d i a o r s o m e t h i n g 
t h e n :i t s h c 1 : ] d h a v e r e e n b r o u g h t 
b e f o r e n o w. We c o u l d ha ve a 0 ne a j u r y 
q u e s t i o n n a i r e or s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h a t to 12 y t : 
a 1 l e v i a t e s o m e of t h o s e c o n c e r n s , w e ' r e h e r e 
n o w . W e d i d n "' t d o t: h a t . 11 • s j u s t g o i 1 2 g :: o i 1 a v ' € 
to go t h r o u g h the voir dire- p r o c e s s , and t h e n 
t h r o u g h the i n s t r u c t i o n p r o c e s s . 
As far as the 1 e s s e r i n c 1 u d e :I t h e 
S t a t e ' s p o s i t i o n is t h a t the o n e s t h a t h a v e .been 
s u b m i t t e d by M r . A r r i n g t o n are p r o b a b l y 
a p p r o p r i a t e , o t h e r t h a n a few v a r i a t i o n s , a n d I 
h a v e p r e p a r e d t h a t I'll w o r k o n and can h a n d o u t 
a f t e r l u n c h to You.r H o n o r and C o u n s e l , I t h i n k 
t h e y are a 1 i t t l e b i t - - T h e y d e a l w i t h 16 a n d 17 
y e a r - o l d s . 1 t h i n k the f a c t s of t h i s case w j 1 1 
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support a finding that only one offense happened 
when he was 16, the rest would have been when he 
was 15. So I think, just as far as the lesser 
included, we maybe need to re-work those so I'll 
have some I'll submit. We're not objecting to the 
lesser included. 
And I think the Jury--juries all the 
time find guilty if they are going to find guilty 
on a lesser included, they do. It's a disservice 
to them to say that they are unable to do that and 
understand the law. 
THE COURT: Mr. Crandall, Mr. Arrington 
indicated that the DA's office has indicated that 
this is a public interest, high profile case. Do 
you have any comment on that? 
MS. CRANDALL: Well, I think tha: that, 
as Mr. Arrington said, yes. There has been media 
interest in it. I received a phone call from Steve 
Hunt at The Tribune yesterday wondering if it was 
going torward. We're not denying t n a t , but that 
shouldn't be a deciding factor over whether or not 
it's a ]udge or a bench trial, or a bench trial or 
a jury trial. If that was a concern, then, as I 
said, that needed to be addressed through a jury 
questionnaire process which, you know, we do jury 
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q u e s t i o n n a i r e s a 3 .1 t h e t i in e . I d i d c n e a c o u p 1 e 
w e e k s a go o n a c a s e . So t h a t c o u l d h a v e e a s i l y 
b e e n h a n d l e d . N o w I s n o t t h e t i m e t :• say - ~. :- z 
b e c a u s e i t ' s h i g n p r o f i l e , t hat a t zhi s p o i n t it 
s h o u Id be a b e n e h t r i a 1 , a n d T d : i i'" t h a v e it in 
f r o n t of me rig h t n o w , b u t I !-::. :- v; t h e r e ' s U t a h 
S up r e m e C o u r t c a s e 1 aw on t h i s i s s u e an d i f y o u are 
:i r ,. c 1 i n e :i t o 1 c D 1 ;: a t t i i a t , :i f \ : i i g i , e i i s s o in e t i m e , 
w e c a n r u n d o w n s t a i r s a n d g e t a m o t i o n to t h a t 
e f f e c t . 
'THE C O U R T : M s . C r a n d a l l , I h a \ e l o o k e d 
at State' v, Serpent, S-E-R P - E - N - T , a 19 8 9 d e c i s i o n 
o f the U t a h Co urt of A p p e a l s . 1 ' ve a l s o l o o k e d at 
S t a t e of Utah v. Robb in s, a 19 5 5 d e c i s i o n of t h e 
U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t , and I • 7 e a ] s o 1 o o k ed at 
of Utah v. Davis, the 1984 d e c i s i o n of t h e U t a h 
S u p r e m e C o u r t . The Robb in s c a s e and t h e o t h e r 
c a s e s i n di c a t e t h a t as a g e n e r a l r u l e , t h a t t h e 
d e f e n d a n t c a n n o t w a i v e a rig h t to a j u r y t r i a l i n ~ 
f e l o n y c a s e , a n d I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t I'm b o u n d b y 
1:1 i a t , b u t w i t h t h a t s a i d , the d e f e n d a n t is t h e one 
t h a t i s c r 1: r i a 1 . The d e f e n d a n t is the one t h a t ' 
f a c e s a l o s s of f r e e d o m for l i f e , and c e r t a i n l y h a s 
a r i g h t to a j u r y , t r i a l , b u t t h e C o u r t s h a v e h e l d , 
g e n e r a l l y , t h a t s h e ' s not — t h a t a d e f e n d a n t is not 
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entitled to generally waive that right to a jury. 
The Court is concerned that the 
defendant, in order to waive that right;, has to 
have the consent of both the Court and the 
prosecution, and if the Court were inclined to give 
its consent and the State did not in this case, it 
seems to this Court that it really places a 
tremendous control over the action in the hands of 
the prosecution when the prosecution and the Court 
understands that the prosecution is representing 
the State, but the State is not the one that's 
subject to a loss of liberty, and the Court is 
concerned about the State having the ability to 
control the case from the standpoint of whether 
it's going to be tried by the jury or fcy the 
Court . 
I will indicate to all parties that I 
would prefer the jury making that decision rather 
than the Court, and I should indicate, Ms. 
Greenwood, that before you could be convicted, ail 
eight members of the jury would have to unanimously 
agree that you were guilty of each and every charge 
alleged and, ma'am, do you understand the 
difference between the jury trial and t he bench 
trial that with a jury trial, all eight members of 
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t h e j i i r y w o u ] ci n a v e t o i : n a n i m o i :. s J y a g r e e , b e y o n d a 
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , that you were g u i l t y of the 
o f f e n s e c h a r g e d or o f f e n s e s c h a r g e d , but w i t h a 
b e n c h t r i a l , that there w c u1d o n1y b e one f i n d e r c >f 
fact and that w o u l d r. e t he C o u r t , and so in s te ad c f 
h a v i n g to c o n v i n c e e i g h t p e o p l e , the State w o u l d 
only have to agree one and I would ask Mr. 
P. r r i n gton if you won 1 d t a k e a in o m e n t a n ci j i :: s t m a k e 
sure that M s . G r e e n w o o d u n d e r s t a n d s t h a t . 
MR. A R R I N G T O N ; Y^z, -.hark y: :: . 
(I n a u d i b l e d i s c u s s i o n ) 
MR. A R R I N G T O N : If I may a d d r e s s the 
C o u r t , Your H o n o r ? 
THE C O U R T : Y e s , p l e a s e . 
-•MR. A R R I N G T O N : Thank you I ha v e 
e x p l a i n e d to her p r i o r to t h i s , I have v i s i t e d her 
at least once every two weeks to ten days or e v e n 
l a t e l y e v e r y ' s e v e r a l days the last few w e e k s and 
spent time with her and she does u n d e r s t a n d t h a t 
tne luea of a u n a n i m o u s jury, that all eight j u r o r s 
w o u l d have to find u n a n i m o u s l y in favor of the 
S t a t e , w h e t h e r it s t he charges f i 1 e ci o r w e ' re 
h o p i n g would be l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s . E v e n 
those must be by u n a n i m o u s d e c i s i o n and that s h o u l d 
there be o n e , even one s t r o n g hold out out of e i g h t 
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jurors that would not budge, then we end up with a 
hung jury. She does know that under the 
circumstances, if there were a hung jury that the 
State would have the option of re-trying her, 
basically, a whole new trial and that should she go 
with a bench, that her fate would lie in the 
decision of one individual, tat being this Court. 
She still feels strongly that she believes the more 
objective and fairness option between the jury and 
the bench lies with the bench. 
THE COURT: Alright, and is there 
anything further from either counsel? 
MR. ARR1NGTON: We would submit, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Ms. Crandall? 
MS. CRANDALL: No, Your Honor. The 
State has made its position clear. 
THE COURT: The Court understands the 
conflicting interests and the Court also 
u n Q s r s u s n u s u n e r u J. e , R u _L e ± > ( c j and L, n s c a s e s u J. i a \_ 
h a ve come d o w n ; h o w e v e r , the Court does not b e l i e v e 
that that in e v e r y case p r e v e n t s a d e f e n d a n t f r o m 
w a i v i n g their right to a jury t r i a l . The C o u r t 
b e l i e v e s that u p o n a p r o p e r s h o w i n g , that the 
d e f e n d a n t should be able to w a i v e her right to a 
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j u r y t r .: a ] , - t 0 a ] 1 c > w t h e S t a t e :i n e v e 1:; / c a s e 
z ~ d e f e a t t h a t w o u l d p l a c e a t re m e n d o u s b u r d e n 0n 
t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t if a s h o w i n g can be m a d e , t h a t 
t b e r e :i s a p r o p e r r e a s o n w h y t h e c a s e s h o u l d b e 
t r i e d to t h e C o u r t: r a 1:1: i e r 11: 1 a n t: 0 11 - B j 1 1 r > 
a p p e a r s to the c0 ur t t h a t t h e r e w o u l d be an 
i m p l i c a t i o n o £ due p r o c e s s r i g h t s to the d e f e n d a n t 
j f t h e C c i 1 r t: 1 ; e r e t c d e 1 1 \ t: h a 1: s :i in p ] ;\, b e c a i 1 s e t: h e 
S t a t e r e f u s e s to g i v e i ts c o n s e n t 10 the w a i v e r . 
• T h e C o u r t is s a t i s f i e d :i 1 1 t h :i s c a s e 
b e c a u s e o f' t h e n a t u r e of the a 1 1 e g a t i o n s a 1 1 d t h e 
p r i o r p u b l i c i t y , a 1 o n g w i t h t h e , 5. s M r .  A r r i n g t o 1 1 
i n d i c a t e d , t h e v e r y f i n e l i n e b e t w e e n the o f f e n s e s 
c h a r g e d a n d t h e p o t e n t i a l l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s . 
"T h e C o u r t b e 1 i e v € s t h a t 2 t \ ; D 1 1 ] d 1: • e a d e n i a ] c f Iv! s . 
Greenwood'.. s d u e p r o c e s s r i g h t s to f o r c e h e r t o be 
t r i e d by. a j u r y . T h e d e f e n s e m o t i o n to w a i v e , t h e 
j u r y is g r a n t e d . 
I w i l l n e e d to t a k e a few m o m e n t s a n d 
s p e a k to. t h e j u r y and let t h e m k n o w t h a t t h e i r 
s e r v i c e s a r e n o t g o i n g 10 be n e e d e d . I'm n o t g o i n g 
t : :i c • i n t o a ny d e t a i l w i t h them.. W i t h t h a t s a. i d., 
I a s s u m e , M s . C r a n d a l l , t h a t y o u p r o b a b l y 
a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t y o u w o u l d n o t p r e s e n t a ny 
w i t n e s s e s u n t i l t h i s a f t e r n o o n , I'm a s s u m i n g . 
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MS. CRANDALL: Your Honor, yes. If we 
could have a recess, we'll decide where we're going 
to go from here. Are you willing to even look at 
this motion that we could put together within ten 
minutes? 
THE COURT: If you want to do that, I 
will certainly consider it, you know, ^here I am at 
this point, but if there's something else that you 
would like to submit to convince the Court 
otherwise, Ms. Crandall, I'll give you an 
opportunity to do so. I don't want to foreclose 
you from presenting anything that you want 
regarding the motion because it is a very important 
motion to both the state and to the defendant. So 
if you want ten minutes, we'll recess and give you 
that opportunity. 
MS. CRANDALL: Okay, thank you, Your 
Honor . 
MR. ARRINGTON: Thank you, ^our Honor. 
(Recess) 
THE COURT: Alright, let's go back on 
the record. We're back on the record m the case 
of State of Utah v. Jamie Lynn Greenwood. The 
defendant is present and so are both counsel. 
Before we get to the matter we were addressing 
THACKERiCO 
ThackerCo.com 
50 West Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
801-983-2180 | 877-441-2180 
Fax. 801-983-2181 
Transcript of Hearing 08/04/10 16 
before the recess, juror number 51 is Dr. Brown. He 
has surgery scheduled at noon. Unless there is 
some objection, I would like to excuse him now. Is 
there any objection to the excusing Dr. Brown at 
this time from the State? 
MS. CRANDALL: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: From the defendant? 
MR. RETALLICK: No, Your Honor. 
MR. ARRINGTON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Alright-, Casey, if you would 
let Dr. Brown know that he is excused. I've also 
now received the State's objection to waiver of the 
jury trial and memorandum in support thereof. I 
will indicate to counsel that I misspelled, when I 
indicated that I read cases, the case that was not 
applicable was Case v. Serpent. That is not 
applicable, and that was included in all of the 
ones that I read, but that has no application to 
this issue, and I'll hear from the State, but I 
will tell the State that I've seen that motion 
because it appears to be very similar to State v. 
Fagness, and I had the benefit of that file. 
That's where I got those earlier cases. S c — 
MR. MATHIS: And, Your Honor, we do 
have copies of the case law that is cited in that 
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motion if you've had an opportunity to read. 
THE COURT: If you would like to argue 
that, I'll hear from you, Mr. Mathis. 
MR. MATHIS: Well, I just have copies 
for the Court before proceeding. 
THE COURT: Oh, alright. Thank you. 
Alright, and I had previously seen Davis and 
Robbins . If you would give me a moment: to look at 
Black and Singer. 
MR. MATHIS: Your Honor, I believe that 
the State did submit those, the Studhain case is 
attached to the Robbins case, and that'' s stapled 
separately. 
THE COURT: Alright, alright, thank you. 
Alright, I'll hear from the State, Mr. Mathis or 
Ms. Crandall? 
MR. MATHIS: Your Honor, I think, just 
to echo the earlier argument that the plain reading 
of the Rule 17(c) clearly does indicate that in 
oiQsr ror a Qcicnusni to waive or ior "cnere 10 .u e 
a waiver of a jury trial, that three things need to 
happen: (1) that the defendant requests it, (2) 
that the Court approves it, and (3) that the State 
gives its consent. 
This identical issue was brought up in 
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State v. Robbin s
 f which is a Utah Supreme Court 
case; State v. Davis, which is another Utah Supreme 
Court case; State v. Studham, additionally a Utah 
Supreme Court case, and Singer v. United States, a 
United States Supreme Court case. In all the Utah 
Supreme Court cases, judge, the Supreme Court held 
that it is a meritless argument to say that it is 
an unconstitutional rule that they have violated 
due process by denying the waiver of a jury trial. 
I don't know that--I have not heard any 
authority that the defendant has cited that would, 
could even come close to circumventing these cases 
or give a separate rationale to say that we're not 
making that same argument. They're making the 
identical argument and this--I believe that the 
Supreme Court is saying that it is a meritless 
claim because it is well settled law. 
I think the plain language of the rule 
which is accepted by the Utah Supreme Court, plus 
the Utah Supreme Court rulings in all the 
aforementioned cases and the holding in the U.S. 
Supreme Court case clearly states that the 
Constitution's guarantee of a fair trial gives a 
defendant a right to safeguard themselves against 
possible jury prejudice by insisting on trial 
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before the judge alone. That is not the argument 
that's necessarily being made today. 
In light of the Constitution emphasis on 
a jury trial, we find it difficult to understand 
how the petitioner could submit the bald 
proposition that to compel the defendant in a 
criminal case to undergo a jury trial against his 
will is contrary to the right to a fair trial or 
due process. There is no constitutional impediment 
to a conditioning a waiver of this right on the 
consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trial 
judge when, if either refuses to consent, the 
result is simply that the defendant is subject to 
an impartial trial by the jury, the very thing that 
the Constitution guarantees them. 
That's what we're dealing with today, 
Judge, and I think that it's very well settled law 
that there is no defendant right to waive a jury 
trial in the absence of consent of the State. 
1 f l JU ^ w VJ I \ J. . h i I 1 y n I f U X X C L U K y w u. . i \ . -L. . 
Arrington or Mr. Retallick, anything farther? 
MR. RETALLICK: Well, Your Honor, 
it's difficult. We're at a disadvantage. We don't 
have an office with law clerks that can run down in 
the extended ten minute break and write up a brief 
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in this matter, Your Honor, but we do maintain that 
some of the cases that's cited indicate that there 
are certain circumstances where this right to a 
jury may be waived in some instances and the Court 
has the discretion which the Court exercised here. 
I just don't have the time and I don't know if Mr. 
Arrington has anything to add to provide further 
legal analysis to this because, as I say, we've 
just received these cases and we're going through 
them right n ow. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Just to echo, Your 
Honor, just that the way the law is written here in 
Utah, and under which-- a 1 though there's similar 
cases, I don't know that they're identical as far 
as the charges are concerned. There is a legal 
fine line between the charges that have been--in 
fact, if I can go back for a moment. She was 
originally booked on charges that we've asked for 
jury instructions of the lesser included offenses. 
The State, upon reviewing the information and the 
discovery submitted by the police department, 
amends the charges ro include the rape, the first 
degree felonies. 
There is a fine line in between the 
charges filed and the charges she was arrested on, 
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and what we're asking for if this goes to a jury, 
to the lesser included offenses. It boils down to 
an issue of consent, and there is jury instructions 
that have been submitted by the State that we're 
going to, at least when it comes to that, take 
issue as to defining coercion, enticement, those 
kinds of things and have brought case law to back 
that up . 
The point being is that there — it's 
going to take, whether it's a bench trial or a jury 
trial, fine hair analysis and coming down to an 
issue of factual v. legal consent in this case, and 
reiterating that my client is, although it would 
rest with a single individual, that being this 
Court, to decide her fate. She is more comfortable 
because we go to deliberation with a legal mind 
versus the jury who, in all likelihood, have no 
understanding of the details and the fine analysis 
between rape and unlawful sexual intercourse and 
unlawful sexual conauct involving a minor, and I 
don't know that they are going to be, although we 
do normally rely on Americans to be intelligent and 
objective in our daily dealings, I don't know that 
they are going to be able to completely understand 
the gravamen in the short time we have in giving 
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jury instructions and for them weighing 
objectively, again, with the media attention that 
has been present on this case. I submit. 
THE COURT: Alright, Mr. Mathis? 
MR. MATHIS: Judge, first I would like 
to respond to the issue that was raised that the 
defense is not given the same advantage as we have. 
I can assure you, we also do not have law clerks 
that do this research for us. We have to do it on 
our own, number one. Number two, given the 
defendant's own admission, this is something that 
they've been talking about for months. So to say 
that this is an unanticipated argument, I think, is 
unpersuasive to me and I believe to be unpersuasive 
to the Court. 
Given also the arguments given by 
defendant today, his claim is that he is afraid 
that the, or that he believes that the Court will 
be more fair and objective than the jury who hasn't 
even been, we haven't even gone through the voir 
dire process. So without even going through the 
voir dire process, Your Honor, I think that that 
puts the burden on the Court, if the Court stays 
with its original ruling, to make the finding that 
the jury pool, as assembled today, is unfair and 
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would be unobjective in hearing the matter today, 
and I think the safe argument, although I haven't 
talked to Mr. Arrington or his colleague today, say 
that they have much more experience than I do or 
Ms. Crandall combined discussing and arguing to 
juries the fine lines of legal analysis in 
different laws. To say that we're unable to do 
that, or they would be unable to do that, I think, 
Your Honor, is just unpersuasive. I mean, that's 
what the very trial is and what it entails. 
THE COURT: Alright, thank you, counsel. 
Let me just say that in my short time en the 
bench, I have been surprised and amazed at the 
collective wisdom of the juries that I've had the 
experience of viewing here in this Courtroom. 
In looking at the Supreme Court, United 
States Supreme Court decision of Singer v. The 
United States, I'm looking at the last page of 
that, the Court states: we need not determine in 
ihis case whether there might be borne cii cumstances 
where a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried 
by a judge alone are so compelling that, the 
government's insistence on trial by jury would 
result in the denial of a defendant of an impartial 
trial. Petitioner argues that there might arise 
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situations where passion, prejudice, public feeling 
or some other factor may render impossible or 
unlikely by an impartial trial by jury; however, 
since petitioner gave no reason for wanting to 
forego jury trial, other than to save time, this is 
not such a case and the petitioner does not claim 
that it is. 
I think the Supreme Court m Singer 
leaves open, as an exception to that general rule 
which the Court recognizes that that is the general 
rule, but I think, based on what has been 
presented, the reasons why the defendant wants to 
waive a jury in this case, because of the nature of 
the allegations, because of the publicity, because 
of the lesser included offenses that the cumulative 
impact of those factors seem, to this Court, to 
require that the Court grant the motion, that the 
State cannot, in every case, prevent the 
defendant's waiver, and it's m the unusual case 
t n a t the State — only 1 n the unusual case is there a 
waiver of the right would be granted, and I think 
this is the unusual case. 
Tne Court believes that to not waive 
the--not allow the defendant to waive a jury trial 
implicates her due process rights and for those 
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reasons the motion is granted. 
We will take a recess. I will excuse 
the jury panel and, Ms. Crandall, when did you 
anticipate starting testimony? 
MS. CRANDALL: Your Honor, the State 
won't be beginning today. If Your Honor would 
issue a written finding, we'll be planning on doing 
an interlocutory appeal on this. 
THE COURT: And does counsel want to be 
heard on that? 
MR. ARRINGTON: Well, Your Honor, 
granted that our concern is my client was 
originally arrested on third degree felony charges. 
She was booked into the jail, bail was set at ten 
thousand dollars for third degree felonies, which 
is a little high, but she paid that bail. The 
State got the case, got the information, amended 
the information, re-filed it as first degree 
felony. She was booked on bail of five hundred 
tnousand aollars, even though sne is 4 2 years old. 
She has no prior record. She's born arid raised in 
Utah. She has been in the same house for 13 years. 
She's been married for 20 years. 
We were able to get the bail down to 
two hundred and fifty thousand dollars; however, 
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that is way above anything that she or her family 
combined to come up with. Understanding that the 
interlocutory appeal is going to take some time, 
she has been a model prisoner. She has even been 
in as a trustee during her stay. She's been in 
custody for five months. There have been no write-
ups or anything. I think it would be appropriate 
to re-visit her custody status and either allow her 
O.R., because she has paid a bail in this matter on 
charges that would be lesser included offenses, or 
at least place her on home confinement pre-trial 
services where she is being constantly supervised. 
It is available down here, or at least lower that 
bail down to something that's much more reasonable. 
Again, any pre-trial services, home confinement 
would be satisfactory for us. 
THE COURT: Alright, anything further 
from the State ? 
MS. CRANDALL: Yes, Your Honor, just so 
we're clear 'ue r e was never an amen: 
information. The defendant was booked on probable 
cause by police officers, by Sandy police, and 
that's what she was booked on. That's what she 
bonded out on. 
The State, once they received the case 
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and actually filed an information, we requested two 
hundred and fifty thousand, at which time, when I 
believe it was Judge Coriss at the time, saw the 
information, he raised it to five hundred thousand. 
We already had a bond hearing back in 
March in front of Judge Kelly. At that point, it 
was lowered to the two hundred and fifty thousand. 
He said if she bailed out, ordered pre-trial 
services after forty-eight hours. We've already 
had that hearing. I don't think what has happened 
here today really changes that in any material 
manner, and the victim has a right, if you are 
inclined to grant for some reason, even though 
there's no legal basis to do so, another bond 
hearing, and we have the right to have the victim 
present, at least speak to him and get some input 
f r om him. 
MR. ARRINGTON: And we would stipulate 
to a bond hearing, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Arringion and Mr. 
Retallick, what is the defendant's position on not 
proceeding with the trial. The State, apparently, 
is going to take an interlocutory appeal, and 
whether or not that will be granted, the Court 
anticipated that we would go ahead and proceed with 
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the trial. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Well, I think the 
interlocutory appeal has been availed just because 
it requires a disposition, I think. We're 
objecting to--we would like to go forward with the 
trial today and proceed. The interlocutory appeal 
is going to take some time. It's going to involve 
other counsel, lots of legal argument and 
preparation I think that this Court is well aware 
of. We would like to proceed with trial today. 
MR. RETALLICK: Your Honor, if I may, 
just one additional point on the interlocutory 
appeal. I've been involved in many of them and one 
of the keys to the interlocutory appeal is that the 
issue that is sought to be decided by the Court of 
Appeals must be--have some dispositive impact on 
the case before the Court. It's not dispositive. 
The only decision would be to reverse you and say 
we should have a jury. Having a jury or not 
having a jury is noi going to be dispositive of the 
underlying charges. 
Typical interlocutory appeal is on a 
suppression issue where the district court — someone 
claims the district court made an error. So if the 
evidence--if the denial of the suppression hearing 
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is reversed, the evidence is allowed in, then that 
becomes dispositive if everything else flows 
through it. 
And so I think, in this claim of a 
right to an interlocutory appeal, while they may 
file it, I don't believe it's provident, and I 
believe it's just another delaying tactic to keep 
defendant in custody longer than absolutely 
necessary. 
THE COURT: Alright, anything further 
from the State? 
MS. CRANDALL: Other than, Your Honor, 
to say this is a delaying tactic to keep the 
defendant in custody is highly offensive. This is 
the first we've heard of even them saying that they 
wanted to waive the jury trial was this morning. 
It hasn't even been brought up. We're just kind of 
snow-balled with it. It's up to the Court of 
Appeals to decide whether or not the interlocutory 
appeal is appropriate and if Your Honor's decision 
is appropriate, and we have the right to request 
that . 
THE COURT: Alright. What we're going to 
do, we will recess until tomorrow morning at 8:30. 
I intend to proceed with the trial at 8:30, unless 
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the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals directs 
me to do otherwise. Thank you. We'll see you 
back here at 8:30 tomorrow morning. 
MR. MATHIS: Your Honor, will the Court 
be placing its findings in writing, or would you 
like defense or the State to do that? 
THE COURT: Mr. Arrington or Mr. 
Retallick, could you prepare findings and an order 
on the motion, and how long would you need to do 
that? 
MR. RETALLICK: If we can get a copy of 
the audio tape, Your Honor, of this proceeding, we 
can get it done probably by the end of the day. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Your Honor, obviously, 
this tape would be to get it done before the end 
of the day in order to contact the Attorney 
General's Office. 
MR. RETALLICK: Okay, it gets two 
minutes, Your Honor. It's 10:30. We could have it 
probably done by 1:00. 
THE COURT: Alright. That will be the 
order. Have that submitted. We'll give you our e-
mail for both the Court, and if the District 
Attorney's Office would give them your e-mail and 
we'll expect that by 1:00 o'clock. Thank you. 
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We'll be in recess. 
MS. CRANDALL: Your Honor, maybe, just 
so we can track where we're at, if we could have a 
Court hearing maybe later this afternoon. We can 
make sure we have those written rulings and, I 
think, at that point, we'll be able to--maybe we 
can give Your Honor the State's better position as 
far as the Attorney General's Office and Court of 
Appeals would say on the matter. I don't know if 
there's any objection to that. I think--
THE COURT: Well, I suppose we could do 
it by phone. Mr. Retallick has to return to Ogden 
to get that done, and Mr. Arrington to North Salt 
Lake. So what is your preference, Mr. Arrington or 
Mr. Retallick? 
MS. CRANDALL: A phone conference is 
f ine . 
MR. ARRINGTON: Telephone conference. 
MR. RETALLICK: Telephone conference 
XI C , -L^U-L H U i l U l • 
THE COURT: Alright. We will plan on a 
telephone conference at 1:30 then. 
MR. RETALLICK: Very good, Your Honor. 
MR. ARRINGTON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And my clerk will set that 
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up. Than k you . 
MR. ARRINGTON: Very well. Thank you 
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10 AUG-5 PH 2=20 
FILED 
^UTAH APPELUTE COUR1 
AUG - 4 2010 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Petitioner, 
v. Case No. 20100632-SC 
Jamie Lynn Greenwood, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court on Petition for Permission 
to Appeal Interlocutory Order filed by the State of Utah, 
accompanied by a Petition for Emergency Relief Pursuant to Rule 
8A of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Court grants a 
provisional stay of the district court proceedings to afford this 
Court the time necessary to consider the Petitions. 
FOR THE COURT: 
<6M-ic> 
Date Matthew B. Durrant 
Associate Chief Justice 
0000121 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
00O00 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP 2 7 2010 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
SEP 2 8 2010 
APPEALS 
V , Case No. 20100632-SC 
Jamie Lynn Greenwood, 
Defendant and Respondent 
ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for 
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed on August 4, 
2010. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Permission to Appeal an 
Interlocutory Order is granted. 
'-%n-iO 
Date 
For The Court: 
s
^.Matl£hew B. D u r r a n t 
Associate Chief Justice 
